A Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies in Science

Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to new domains. While the first is plausible for some cases, only the second can account for the liquid drop case study

Chapter 3 Mortar and Pestle or Cooking Vessel? When Archaeology Makes Progress Through Failed Analogies

Most optimistic accounts of analogies in archaeology focus on cases where analogies lead to accurate or well-supported interpretations of the past. This chapter offers a complementary argument: analogies can also provide a valuable form of understanding of cultural and social phenomena when they fail, in the sense of either being shown inaccurate or the evidence being insufficient to determine their accuracy. This type of situation is illustrated through a case study involving the mortarium, a characteristic type of Roman pottery, and its relation to the so-called Romanization debate in Romano-British archaeology. I develop an account of comparative understanding, based on the idea that humans have a natural desire to understand ourselves comparatively, i.e., in terms of how we resemble and differ from societies at other times and places. Pursuing analogies can provide this type of understanding regardless of whether they turn out to be accurate. Furthermore, analogies can provide a similar form of understanding even when the evidence turns out to be insufficient to determine their accuracy

Hypothesis Generation and Pursuit in Scientific Reasoning

This thesis draws a distinction between (i) reasoning about which scientific hypothesis to accept, (ii) reasoning concerned with generating new hypotheses and (iii) reasoning about which hypothesis to pursue. I argue that (ii) and (iii) should be evaluated according to the same normative standard, namely whether the hypotheses generated/selected are pursuit worthy. A consequentialist account of pursuit worthiness is defended, based on C. S. Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ and the ‘economy of research’, and developed as a family of formal, decision-theoretic models. This account is then deployed to discuss four more specific topics concerning scientific reasoning. First, I defend an account according to which explanatory reasoning (including the ‘inference to the best explanation’) mainly provides reasons for pursuing hypotheses, and criticise empirical arguments for the view that it also provides reasons for acceptance. Second, I discuss a number of pursuit worthiness accounts of analogical reasoning in science, arguing that, in some cases, analogies allow scientists to transfer an already well-understood modelling framework to a new domain. Third, I discuss the use of analogies within archaeological theorising, arguing that the distinction between using analogies for acceptance, generation and pursuit is implicit in methodological discussions in archaeology. A philosophical analysis of these uses is presented. Fourth, diagnostic reasoning in medicine is analysed from the perspective of Peircean abduction, where the conception of abduction as strategic reasoning is shown to be particularly important

Chapter 3 Mortar and Pestle or Cooking Vessel? When Archaeology Makes Progress Through Failed Analogies

Most optimistic accounts of analogies in archaeology focus on cases where analogies lead to accurate or well-supported interpretations of the past. This chapter offers a complementary argument: analogies can also provide a valuable form of understanding of cultural and social phenomena when they fail, in the sense of either being shown inaccurate or the evidence being insufficient to determine their accuracy. This type of situation is illustrated through a case study involving the mortarium, a characteristic type of Roman pottery, and its relation to the so-called Romanization debate in Romano-British archaeology. I develop an account of comparative understanding, based on the idea that humans have a natural desire to understand ourselves comparatively, i.e., in terms of how we resemble and differ from societies at other times and places. Pursuing analogies can provide this type of understanding regardless of whether they turn out to be accurate. Furthermore, analogies can provide a similar form of understanding even when the evidence turns out to be insufficient to determine their accuracy

A Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies in Science

Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to new domains. While the first is plausible for some cases, only the second can account for the liquid drop case study

From General Principles to Procedural Values: Responsible Digital Health Meets Public Health Ethics

Most existing work in digital ethics is modeled on the “principlist” approach to medical ethics, seeking to articulate a small set of general principles to guide ethical decision-making. Critics have highlighted several limitations of such principles, including (1) that they mask ethical disagreements between and within stakeholder communities, and (2) that they provide little guidance for how to resolve trade-offs between different values. This paper argues that efforts to develop responsible digital health practices could benefit from paying closer attention to a different branch of medical ethics, namely public health ethics. In particular, I argue that the influential “accountability for reasonableness” (A4R) approach to public health ethics can help overcome some of the limitations of existing digital ethics principles. A4R seeks to resolve trade-offs through decision-procedures designed according to certain shared procedural values. This allows stakeholders to recognize decisions reached through these procedures as legitimate, despite their underlying disagreements. I discuss the prospects for adapting A4R to the context of responsible digital health and suggest questions for further research

The Role and Limits of Principles in AI Ethics: Towards a Focus on Tensions

The last few years have seen a proliferation of principles for AI ethics. There is substantial overlap between different sets of principles, with widespread agreement that AI should be used for the common good, should not be used to harm people or undermine their rights, and should respect widely held values such as fairness, privacy, and autonomy. While articulating and agreeing on principles is important, it is only a start- ing point. Drawing on comparisons with the field of bioethics, we highlight some of the limitations of principles: in particular, they are often too broad and high-level to guide ethics in practice. We suggest that an important next step for the field of AI ethics is to focus on exploring the tensions that inevitably arise as we try to implement principles in practice. By explicitly recognising these tensions we can begin to make decisions about how they should be resolved in specific cases, and develop frameworks and guidelines for AI ethics that are rigorous and practically relevant. We discuss some different specific ways that tensions arise in AI ethics, and what processes might be needed to resolve them.Work supported by the Nuffield Foundation and Leverhulme Trus

Public Health and Risk Communication During COVID-19—Enhancing Psychological Needs to Promote Sustainable Behavior Change

Background: The current COVID-19 pandemic requires sustainable behavior change to mitigate the impact of the virus. A phenomenon which has arisen in parallel with this pandemic is an infodemic—an over-abundance of information, of which some is accurate and some is not, making it hard for people to find trustworthy and reliable guidance to make informed decisions. This infodemic has also been found to create distress and increase risks for mental health disorders, such as depression and anxiety. Aim: To propose practical guidelines for public health and risk communication that will enhance current recommendations and will cut through the infodemic, supporting accessible, reliable, actionable, and inclusive communication. The guidelines aim to support basic human psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness to support well-being and sustainable behavior change. Method: We applied the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and concepts from psychology, philosophy and human computer interaction to better understand human behaviors and motivations and propose practical guidelines for public health communication focusing on well-being and sustainable behavior change. We then systematically searched the literature for research on health communication strategies during COVID-19 to discuss our proposed guidelines in light of the emerging literature. We illustrate the guidelines in a communication case study: wearing face-coverings. Findings: We propose five practical guidelines for public health and risk communication that will cut through the infodemic and support well-being and sustainable behavior change: (1) create an autonomy-supportive health care climate; (2) provide choice; (3) apply a bottom-up approach to communication; (4) create solidarity; (5) be transparent and acknowledge uncertainty. Conclusion: Health communication that starts by fostering well-being and basic human psychological needs has the potential to cut through the infodemic and promote effective and sustainable behavior change during such pandemics. Our guidelines provide a starting point for developing a concrete public health communication strategy

What is a subliminal technique? An ethical perspective on AI-driven influence

Concerns about threats to human autonomy feature prominently in the field of AI ethics. One aspect of this concern relates to the use of AI systems for problematically manipulative influence. In response to this, the European Union’s draft AI Act (AIA) includes a prohibition on AI systems deploying subliminal techniques that alter people’s behavior in ways that are reasonably likely to cause harm (Article 5(1)(a)). Critics have argued that the term ‘subliminal techniques’ is too narrow to capture the target cases of AI-based manipulation. We propose a definition of ‘subliminal techniques’ that (a) is grounded on a plausible interpretation of the legal text; (b) addresses all or most of the underlying ethical concerns motivating the prohibition; (c) is defensible from a scientific and philosophical perspective; and (d) does not over-reach in ways that impose excessive administrative and regulatory burdens. The definition is meant to provide guidance for design teams seeking to pursue responsible and ethically aligned AI innovation